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WHOSE RIGHTS MATTER MORE—POLICE
PRIVACY OR A DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A
FAIR TRIAL?
Laurie L. Levenson*
The function of the prosecutor under the federal Constitution is
not to tack as many skins of victims as possible to the wall. His function
is to vindicate the right of the people as expressed in the laws and give
those accused of crime a fair trial.
– William O. Douglas1

* Professor of Law and David W. Burcham Chair in Ethical Advocacy, Loyola Law School,
Los Angeles. Professor Levenson is extremely grateful to her amazing research assistants, Charles
Lam and Chloe Rome, as well as to the outstanding editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review. Thank you all for your commitment to improving our criminal justice system.
1. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648–49 (1974) (Douglas J., dissenting). During
Justice Douglas’ thirty-six years on the bench he was accused of judicial activism and remained a
controversial figure throughout his tenure. Melvin I. Urofsky, William O. Douglas as a Common
Law Judge, 41 DUKE L.J. 133, 133 (1991). He is credited with resurrecting the Equal Protection
Clause and eventually pushing the Court toward the holding in Brown v. Board of Education. Id.
at 144, 153.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The fight over fair trials has hit the streets. In 2020, there has been
constant strife over whether law enforcement is committed to
protecting the public and guaranteeing fair administration of justice.
There are no simple answers to the question of balancing a defendant’s
right to a fair trial against the interests of law enforcement. This
tension has arisen in many contexts—from the struggle over the
excessive force to challenges to police privacy. In the context of a
defendant’s right to a fair trial, the key to finding the right balance has
been provided by the California Supreme Court itself. Under the Sixth
Amendment, defendants are entitled to exculpatory evidence as a
matter of due process. While some of this exculpatory evidence might
also embarrass or challenge the work of law enforcement officers, the
rights of defendants must prevail. The case of Association for Los
Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court (ALADS)2 is about that
balance.
In authoring the California Supreme Court’s unanimous decision,
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye identifies the critical issue: “This case
concerns the relationship between prosecutors’ constitutional duty to
disclose information to criminal defendants and a statutory scheme
that restricts prosecutors’ access to some of that information.”3 Even
the articulation of the key tension in this case reflects a critical,
underlying problem with law enforcement—officers see their interests
independent of the criminal justice system. To the extent the justice
system wants to protect a defendant’s right to due process, law
enforcement takes the view that the defendant’s interests are, at times,
subservient to the interests of law enforcement. While that may be true
when safety issues are at stake—and even then, a defendant’s rights
should be respected—the notion that a defendant’s right to a fair trial
could be compromised because of officers’ privacy rights seems
fundamentally unjust. Yet, that is the system that has been created in
California and it is a system that must be critically examined, as it was
in the ALADS decision. The court’s decision began the discussion. It
is up to those who are committed to a fair trial to continue that
conversation and usher in a new era where it doesn’t take a supreme

2. 447 P.3d 234 (Cal. 2019).
3. Id. at 238–39.
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court decision to ensure that the balance goes to a defendant’s right to
a fair trial.
Part I of this Article sets forth the framework of the debate over
the proper balancing of defendants’ rights to a fair trial and protection
of law enforcement officers’ rights of privacy.4 After discussing the
background of the case, including the facts and issues set forth in
ALADS, this first section analyzes the critical right of a defendant to
exculpatory evidence and how that right has been compromised over
the years by the byzantine approach of requiring defendants to file
special Pitchess motions to get access to information in police
officers’ files that could help the defense.
Part II addresses why the court really had no choice, under
constitutional principles, to issue a ruling in favor of disclosure of the
officers’ confidential personnel files. If the justice system’s
commitment to defendants’ due process rights is sincere in the least,
then the balance between officers’ rights of privacy and the right to a
fair trial must fall in favor of fair trials.
Part III discusses why recent legislative changes not only trump
the court’s decision, but also reflect a newfound energy among the
populace to bring fairness to the criminal justice system in a manner
that is bolder, more effective, and less cumbersome than the approach
by the court in ALADS. In 2018, while the ALADS case was pending,5
the California legislature passed Senate Bill (SB) 1421, The Right to
Know Act.6 It gives the public the right, under the California Public
Records Act, to see records relating to police misconduct and serious
uses of force.7
Together, the ALADS decision and SB 1421 may usher in a new
era of police accountability. They couldn’t have come too soon. The
public has long been frustrated with the seemingly impenetrable wall
built around police officers. Even apart from the laws that protect
4. While this Article focuses on the privacy interests of peace officers, similar issues can
arise in the disclosure of other public employee records under the California Public Records Act.
See generally Alexandra B. Andreen, Comment, The Cost of Sunshine: The Threat to Public
Employee Privacy Posed by the California Public Records Act, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 869 (2015)
(explaining that California courts have favored the disclosure of public employee records, such as
complaints about public employees, employee investigative reports, pay data and salary
information, retirement benefits and pension data, and personnel disciplinary documents).
5. In its decision, the California Supreme Court acknowledged the passage of Senate Bill
1421 and its impact on one of the statutes in question. ALADS, 447 P.3d at 241.
6. S.B. 1421, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
7. See id.
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officers’ privacy, doctrines such as qualified immunity8 and the “good
faith exception” to the exclusionary rule9 have for years protected
officers from being held accountable for this misconduct. The 2020
protests throughout America10 affirm the public’s support for the
California Supreme Court’s approach in ALADS. It is a decision that
provides a window into the future of police accountability.
II. ALADS: WHAT WAS AT STAKE?
The ALADS case arose when the Deputy Sheriffs’ Association
sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the Los Angeles Sheriff’s
Department from disclosing the identity of officers who had been
identified as committing administrative violations ranging from
tampering with evidence, to providing false information against
defendants, to engaging in unreasonable use of force and
discriminatory harassment.11 The Sheriff’s Department had created a

8. Qualified immunity is a judicially developed doctrine that provides immunity to executive
officials “for violating constitutional principles that they could not have reasonably known.” Mark
R. Brown, The Fall and Rise of Qualified Immunity: From Hope to Harris, 9 NEV. L.J. 185, 185
(2008). The Supreme Court has continuously reaffirmed qualified immunity because it “protect[s]
government officials from financial liability” and guards against “the danger that fear of being sued
will ‘dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in
the unflinching discharge of their duties.’” Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127
YALE L.J. 2, 14 (2017) (second alteration in original) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
814 (1982)).
9. In order to trigger the exclusionary rule, “police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate
that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the
price paid by the justice system.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009). However,
the exclusionary rule has a good faith exception: it does not apply if the police acted in “objectively
reasonable reliance” on mistaken information. Id. at 142. The test for this exception is whether a
“‘reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal’ in light of ‘all of
the circumstances.’” Id. at 145 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984)).
10. See Larry Buchanan et al., Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S.
History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/georgefloyd-protests-crowd-size.html; Eliott C. McLaughlin, How George Floyd’s Death Ignited a Racial
Reckoning That Shows No Signs of Slowing Down, CNN (Aug. 9, 2020, 11:31 AM), https://www.
cnn.com/2020/08/09/us/george-floyd-protests-different-why/index.html; Lara Putnam et al., The
Floyd Protests Are the Broadest in U.S. History—and Are Spreading to White, Small-Town
America, WASH. POST BLOGS (June 6, 2020, 6:11 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politic
s/2020/06/06/floyd-protests-are-broadest-us-history-are-spreading-white-small-town-america/.
11. ALADS, 447 P.3d 234, 239–40 (Cal. 2019). According to the record in the case, the list of
administrative violations included: (1) “Immoral Conduct”; (2) “Bribes, Rewards, Loans, Gifts,
Favors”; (3) “Misappropriation of Property”; (4) “Tampering with Evidence”; (5) “False
Statements”; (6) “Failure to make Statements and/or Making False Statements During
Departmental Internal Investigations”; (7) “Obstructing an Investigation/Influencing a Witness”;
(8) “False Information in Records”; (9) “Policy of Equality—Discriminatory Harassment”; (10)
“Unreasonable Force”; and (11) “Family Violence.” Id. at 240.
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“Brady list” of these officers’ names and their misconduct.12 The
information in those records was precisely the type of information that
must ordinarily be disclosed to defendants in criminal cases under the
Brady doctrine.13 However, the Sheriffs’ Association sought to ban
their disclosure as violating the officers’ right to privacy.14 Citing the
so-called Pitchess statutes,15 the Sheriffs’ Association claimed that the
Sheriff’s Department was barred from releasing the information
without a court order.16
Under the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Brady v.
Maryland17 and Giglio v. United States,18 prosecutors must disclose to
the defense both exculpatory evidence and evidence that can be used
to impeach a law enforcement officer’s testimony.19 Prosecutors have
this duty even if they are not personally aware that the evidence
exists.20 Prosecutors are responsible for the exculpatory and
impeachment information in law enforcement files—the very type of
information the Sheriffs recorded on their “Brady” lists.21 The
12. Id. at 239.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 240.
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7(a) (Deering 2020) makes confidential certain personnel
records of citizens’ complaints, as well as information “obtained from” those records. Until the
ALADS decision, defendants could only obtain those records when they filed a motion showing
good cause, and a court would conduct an in camera inspection of the confidential information to
determine whether it needed to be disclosed. See Pitchess v. Superior Ct., 522 P.2d 305, 307 (Cal.
1974), superseded by statute, Act of Feb. 22, 1974, ch. 29, 1974 Cal. Stat. 42, 42–43 (codified as
amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.5 (Deering 2020)); see also People v. Superior Ct., 377 P.3d
847, 857 (Cal. 2015) (holding that the prosecution must comply with the procedures of Pitchess “if
it wishes to obtain information from confidential [peace officer] personnel records”); 1 BRIAN M.
HOFFSTADT, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DISCOVERY § 12.08 (5th ed. 2019) (a complete analysis of
Pitchess and motions filed under it).
16. ALADS, 447 P.3d at 239–40.
17. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) Defendant Brady and companion, Boblit, were both charged with first
degree murder and sentenced to death. Defendants were tried separately. Prior to trial, Brady’s
defense counsel had asked the prosecution for Boblit’s statements. However, the prosecution
withheld a statement in which Boblit admitted to the homicide. Brady moved for a new trial due to
this undisclosed evidence. Id. at 84. Under Brady, evidence must be disclosed to the defense, even
without a defense request, if the evidence is favorable to the accused. Failure to do so violates a
defendant’s right to a fair trial, even if the prosecution’s failure to disclose is inadvertent. So long
as the evidence is “material” to the defense, it must be disclosed. See Laurie L. Levenson, Discovery
from the Trenches: The Future of Brady, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 74, 77 (2013).
18. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
19. See generally R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable
Problem of Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1437–38 (2011) (describing the
nature of impeachment evidence and a prosecutor’s duty to disclose).
20. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
21. See Ryan T. Cannon, Note, Reconciling Brady and Pitchess: Association for Los Angeles
Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court, and the Future of Brady Lists, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729, 736
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Sheriff’s Department recognized this,22 but the Sheriffs’ Association
still contested disclosure, claiming that Brady rights were limited by
the officers’ privacy rights.23
The trial court in ALADS agreed with the Sheriffs’ Association
that the identity of peace officers was confidential, but did not enjoin
the Department from disclosing the fact that an individual Deputy
Sheriff is listed on the “Brady list” when a criminal prosecution was
pending and the Deputy Sheriff was a potential witness. 24 The court of
appeal granted a writ of mandate by the Sheriffs’ Association and an
immediate stay.25 It held that disclosure could only be made after a
Pitchess motion is filed, heard, and granted.26 The process dictated by
Pitchess makes it extremely difficult for defendants to obtain
information regarding officers unless they already have a “good faith”

(2018) [hereinafter Cannon, Reconciling Brady and Pitchess] (Brady lists are lists compiled by
prosecutors or police agencies of the names of witnesses, including law enforcement officers, who
have information in their backgrounds that should be disclosed as impeachment evidence for the
defense).
22. In a letter that the Sheriff’s Department sent to its deputies, it advised them that “in order
to comply with our constitutional obligations, [the Department is] required to provide the names of
employees with potential exculpatory or impeachment material in their personnel file to the District
Attorney and other prosecutorial agencies where the employee may be called as a witness.” ALADS,
447 P.3d 234, 240 (Cal. 2019).
23. Id. There is a long history of the fight in Los Angeles between law enforcement and those
seeking more access to the records of police and sheriff officers. In 1974, the California Supreme
Court held, in Pitchess v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, that criminal defendants could
access peace officer personnel records. 522 P.2d 305 (Cal. 1974), superseded by statute, Act of
Feb. 22, 1974, ch. 29, 1974 Cal. Stat. 42, 42–43 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.5
(Deering 2020)). In response to the decision, law enforcement unions and prosecutorial offices
lobbied fiercely against such intrusions on law enforcement privacy. See Katherine J. Bies, Note,
Let the Sunshine in: Illuminating the Powerful Role Police Unions Play in Shielding Officer
Misconduct, 28 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 109, 130 (2017). However, they went beyond objecting to
access to police files. Some departments even began shredding their records. See id. at 127. Critics
began to highlight the problem in the choices being made by the public. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps,
Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures
Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 (1993). The net result
was the enactment of CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7 (Deering 2020) (“Police Officer’s Bill of Rights”).
Until ALADS was decided, the Pitchess procedure was used to limit disclosures of police
misconduct. See Pitchess, 522 P.2d at 305.
24. ALADS, 447 P.3d at 240.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 241. There was a dissent by Justice Elizabeth Grimes who believed a Pitchess motion
is not required to transfer to the prosecution team the identities of officers who may have Brady
materials in their personnel records. Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Ct., 221 Cal. Rptr.
3d 51, 80–99 (Ct. App. 2017) (Grimes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that a
Pitchess motion is not required to transfer to the prosecution team the identities of officers who
may have Brady materials in their personnel records), rev’d, 447 P.3d 234 (Cal. 2019).
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basis for believing the officers have engaged in misconduct.27 Even
then, information was limited to records from the past five years.28 For
most defendants, a Pitchess motion was an act of futility because of
the procedural barriers to procuring the information. Without shifting
the burden to law enforcement to be forthright regarding an officer’s
background, individual defendants frequently faced an
insurmountable obstacle to obtaining information.
In deciding ALADS, the California Supreme Court finally came
to terms with how the obstacles under Pitchess compromised
defendants’ due process rights. It began its decision by noting that the
heart of the issue raised by the case is a defendant’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process of law.29 While no one disputed that
the Pitchess procedure and state laws were designed to protect the
confidentiality of law enforcement officers’ records, the key issue was
whether that interest should prevail when prosecutors need such
information to comply with their constitutional duties under Brady and
Giglio.30
Ultimately, the court concluded that the confidentiality created by
the Pitchess statutes does not forbid disclosure to prosecutors of Brady
alerts.31 In an important recognition that the time has come to
27. In order to obtain information from an officer’s personnel records, a moving party must
first file a written motion with documentation that makes a prima facie showing that there is “good
cause” to have the court conduct an in camera review of the files for any documents on point. CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1043(b)(3) (Deering 2020). The moving party must show good cause, which requires
stating “upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or
information from the records” and the information is material to the underlying proceeding. Id.
Once the movant establishes good cause, the court must conduct an in camera review of the officer’s
personnel records for “information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
litigation.” HOFFSTADT, supra note 15, § 12.10 (alteration in original). After the review, the court
may rule that the personnel file contains relevant information and order the agency possessing the
records to disclose them to the movant. Id. § 12.11. Disclosure can take place over two phases: In
the first phase, “[t]he court should order the agency to disclose the name, address, and telephone
number of the individuals who have witnessed or complained of the prior officer misconduct.” Id.
If that disclosure “‘proves insufficient,’ a court may then order the disclosure of the witness’s full
statements or the underlying complaints, reports or other documentation.” Id. (quoting Rezek v.
Superior Ct., 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 891, 896 (Ct. App. 2012)). The court must also order that “the
records disclosed or discovered may not be used for any purpose other than a court proceeding
pursuant to applicable law.” CAL. EVID. CODE § 1045(e).
28. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1045(b)(1).
29. ALADS, 447 P.3d at 241.
30. Id. at 239.
31. Id. at 248. The Chief Justice wrote: “Viewing the Pitchess statutes ‘against the larger
background of the prosecution’s [Brady] obligation,’ . . . we instead conclude that the Department
may provide prosecutors with the Brady alerts at issue here without violating confidentiality.” Id.
at 249 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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recognize how important access to law enforcement officers’ files can
be to a defendant’s fair trial, the court held that Pitchess statutes must
be viewed “against the larger background of the prosecution’s [Brady]
obligation.”32 “Because confidential records may contain Brady
material, construing the Pitchess statutes to permit Brady alerts best
‘harmonize[s]’ Brady and Pitchess.”33 “[T]o cut off the flow of
information from law enforcement personnel to prosecutors would be
anathema to Brady compliance.”34
The 2020 protests on the streets regarding police misconduct are
an important reminder of why there needs to be more transparency
regarding police officers’ backgrounds. The officer charged with
murder for his excessive force against George Floyd had a record of
using excessive force.35 Officers convicted in the notorious Rampart
Scandal had prior records of misconduct.36 Giving prosecutors—and
thereby the defense—information regarding officers not only provides
an individual defendant the right to a fair trial, but is an important tool
in ferreting out problem officers before irreparable harm is done.
While the due process right for defendants is enshrined in the U.S.
Constitution, statutes protecting police officer privacy are relatively
recent. The first “Law Enforcement Officers Bill of Rights” was
adopted in the 1970s.37 In the decades it has existed, it has frustrated
those who sought police reform. Police Bills of Rights across the
32. Id. at 244 (quoting People v. Mooc, 36 P.3d 21, 28 (Cal. 2001)).
33. Id. at 249 (alteration in original).
34. Id. At the same time that the California Supreme Court embraced greater disclosure, state
officials and the State Bar did likewise. California Attorney General Kamala Harris issued Opinion
No. 12-401, which approved of a Brady list policy proposed by the California District Attorneys
Association. See 98 Ops. Cal. Att’y Gen. 54 (2015). In 2018, the State Bar of California proposed
Rule 3.8 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct (Special Responsibilities of Prosecutors)
that was adopted by the California Supreme Court and became effective on November 1, 2018. See
Laurie L. Levenson, The Politics of Ethics, 69 MERCER L. REV. 753, 758 (2018). That rule includes
a requirement that prosecutors disclose all evidence known or unknown to the prosecutor that might
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the sentence. See id. at 756. As with the ALADS decision
and SB 1421, the adoption of Rule 3.8 involved considerable political maneuvering by those with
a stake in the new rule. See id.
35. Derek Hawkins, Officer Charged in George Floyd’s Death Used Fatal Force Before and
Had History of Complaints, WASH. POST (May 29, 2020, 3:47 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/nation/2020/05/29/officer-charged-george-floyds-death-used-fatal-force-before-had-historycomplaints/.
36. Lou Cannon, One Bad Cop, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 1, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/
2000/10/01/magazine/one-bad-cop.html.
37. See Rebecca Tan, There’s a Reason It’s Hard to Discipline Police. It Starts with a Bill of
Rights 47 Years Ago., WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
history/2020/08/29/police-bill-of-rights-officers-discipline-maryland/.
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country have routinely blocked investigations and emboldened police
misconduct.38 The decision in ALADS was a timely pushback on this
fifty-year trend.39
III. MAKING A CHOICE: CHOOSING THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
The California Supreme Court was on firm ground in reaching its
decision that the balance of rights must favor defendants in our
criminal justice system. Since the 1960s, prosecutors have had the
obligation to provide exculpatory and impeachment information to the
defense.40 Yet, fulfilling that obligation was difficult when the very
information that needed to be disclosed was not in the hands of the
prosecution. In making law enforcement records confidential, the
legislature had not taken into account prosecutors’ discovery
obligations.41
Nor did the legislature anticipate how far law enforcement might
go to protect the confidential files of its rank and file officers. Seeking
an injunction to prevent disclosure was one of the more modest efforts
by the police unions. Previously, there had been efforts to shred and
conceal police records.42 “In one particularly dramatic episode, the
Los Angeles City Attorney and the LAPD conspired to shred records
of complaints against officers as a way of preventing discovery. The
LAPD covertly destroyed four tons of police files during a single
month in 1976.”43
Thus, while the California Supreme Court wanted to honor the
Pitchess procedure and confidentiality interests of officers as set forth
in Penal Codes §§ 832.7 and 832.8 and Evidence Codes §§ 1043–
38. Id. (“[T]he Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights has been one of the biggest
obstructions to police accountability, hindering investigations and shielding misconduct from
public scrutiny.”).
39. The focus of the decision was, of course, only on California’s law enforcement agencies.
Yet, given that California has one-tenth of all the officers in the United States (about eighty
thousand police officers), Bulletin, Brian A. Reaves, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Census of State and Local
Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008, at 15 app. tbl.6 (July 2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/csllea08.pdf, it is likely to have an impact beyond California’s borders as other states evaluate
how to address the issue of disclosing police misconduct. For example, even as the ALADS case
was ongoing, New Hampshire, Colorado, Vermont, and Maine faced similar issues. See Jonathan
Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files and the Battle Splitting
the Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743, 766–70 (2015). Moreover, the cry for public access
spread across the country—far beyond the actual ALADS litigation. Id. at 770–71.
40. Abel, supra note 39, at 752.
41. See id. at 763.
42. See Bies, supra note 23, at 127.
43. Cannon, Reconciling Brady and Pitchess, supra note 21, at 734.
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1045, the Court was fully aware that there was no limit to how far
some law enforcement groups would go to prevent disclosure. When
it comes to balancing, a court must consider how much room there is
for trusting both sides to honor their obligations under the federal
Constitution. Law enforcement gave the court little reason to believe
that a more nuanced approach would succeed in protecting
defendants’ rights. The Sheriffs’ Association wrapped itself in a series
of decisions regarding police privacy.44 They did so even though the
Sheriff’s Department itself had created and kept the Brady lists, in
recognition that there was a significant constitutional right at stake.
Thus, by the time the California Supreme Court decided ALADS,
the choice was clear. The court could continue to strengthen officers’
privacy under the Pitchess laws or open the door to require law
enforcement help ensure that defendants receive fair trials. The court
let the door swing open.
Although the ALADS decision focuses on a defendant’s discovery
rights, the ultimate balance was between a defendant’s right to a fair
trial45 and an officer’s right to privacy. More accurately, it was
between the practical need to protect officers from scrutiny versus a
defendant’s right to a fair trial. As the court and society became more
willing to closely scrutinize police behavior, the officers’ interest in
privacy sank in comparison to a defendant’s right to a fair trial. It
would be odd for the court to reach a decision that constrained law
enforcement from protecting a defendant’s right to a fair trial.
IV. MOVING BEYOND THE COURTS: LEGISLATING ACCESS TO POLICE
FILES
The ALADS case was litigated for almost four years. During that
time, frustration grew over the lack of accountability by law
enforcement and the inability to obtain information regarding police
misconduct.46 State Senator Nancy Skinner first introduced SB 142147
44. The appellate court relied on a series of cases known as the “Copley Press” cases. Id. at
739. As news agencies sought police records under the California Public Records Act, the Court
held that Pitchess confidentiality extended beyond criminal and civil proceedings to third party
disclosures. Id. at 739–40. In other words, it cut off other avenues for seeking police accountability.
45. In Brady v. Maryland, Justice Douglas linked the right to discovery to the right to a fair
trial in stating, “[s]ociety wins . . . when criminal trials are fair.” 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
46. See Liam Dillon, California Legislature Passes Major Police Transparency Measures on
Internal Investigations and Body Cameras, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2018, 3:25 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-police-transparency-bill-passes-20180831-story.html.
47. For purposes of this Article, the key provisions of SB 1421 were: Sec. 1(b):
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on February 16, 2018.48 Prior to her election to the California State
Senate, Skinner was a member of the California State Assembly for
six years.49 She represented Californians living in the Berkeley area of
California,50 a district known for social action and a willingness to take
the lead on social justice reforms. In 2016, Skinner was elected to the
State Senate.51 While in office, she served on the Senate’s Public
Safety Committee.52
By the time Skinner introduced SB 1421, she was no newcomer
to criminal justice reforms.53 She had authored reforms of the
detention on foster youth, unfair incarceration of youth, and the need
for funding reentry programs.54 She had moved to close the loophole
in California’s assault weapons ban and spoke openly about the
problems with policing in California.55 As she stated in her press

The public has a right to know all about serious police misconduct, as well as about
officer-involved shootings and other serious uses of force. Concealing crucial public
safety matters such as officer violations of civilians’ rights, or inquiries into deadly use
of force incidents, undercuts the public’s faith in the legitimacy of law enforcement,
makes it harder for tens of thousands of hardworking peace officers to do their jobs, and
endangers public safety.
Sec. 2(b)(1):
Notwithstanding [other provisions of law], the following peace officer or custodial
officer personnel records and records maintained by any state or local agency shall not
be confidential and shall be made available for public inspection pursuant to the
California Public Records Act . . . :
(A) A record relating to the report, investigation, or findings of any of the following: . .
. An incident involving the discharge of a firearm at a person by a peace officer or
custodial officer. . . . An incident in which the use of force by a peace officer or custodial
officer against a person resulted in death, or in great bodily injury. . . .
(B)(i) Any record relating to an incident . . . [involving an officer’s sexual assault]. . . .
(C) Any record relating to an incident in which a sustained finding was made by
any law enforcement agency or oversight agency of dishonesty by a peace officer or
custodial officer directly relating to the reporting, investigation, or prosecution of
a crime, or directly relating to the reporting of, or investigation of misconduct by,
another peace officer or custodial officer, including, but not limited to, any
sustained finding of perjury, false statements, filling false reports, destruction,
falsifying, or concealing of evidence.
S.B. 1421, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (emphasis added).
48. CAL. STATE S., HISTORY OF SENATE BILL NO. 1421, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
49. Senator Nancy Skinner: Biography, CAL. STATE SENATE DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS,
https://sd09.senate.ca.gov/biography (last visited Nov. 22, 2020).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id.; Press Release, Senator Nancy Skinner, Senator Skinner Introduces SB 1421 to
Open Law Enforcement Records (Apr. 2, 2018), https://sd09.senate.ca.gov/news/20180402-
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release upon the introduction of SB 1421, “[b]uilding trust between
police and communities has to start with transparency . . . . SB 1421
ensures that when officers use serious or deadly force, engage in
sexual assault or are dishonest in carrying out their duties, the public
is informed.”56 The fundamental basis for the new law was that the
legitimacy of our very criminal justice system depends on holding bad
officers accountable and enabling civilians to have fair trials—
whether criminal cases or civil rights actions against police—by
having access to the information that reveals police misconduct.
Some of the provisions of SB 1421 addressed public access to law
enforcement agency records related to the discharge of a firearm and
to coercing an individual into having sex. However, the provision that
most overlapped with Brady was that which allowed access to records
showing a law enforcement officer’s dishonesty in reporting,
investigating, or prosecuting a crime. It is this provision that is crucial
in giving defendants access to information that may help defend
themselves when there is a possibility that an officer involved in their
case was dishonest or handled evidence or witnesses in the case
dishonestly.
It took seven months for SB 1421 to make its way through the
legislative process. 57 Notwithstanding the strength of the police
unions,58 the California legislature and Governor Jerry Brown adopted
this crucial law.59 The importance of having a change in the law come
from both the judicial and legislative branches cannot be overstated.
Courts are frequently blamed for being too judicially active. The
California Supreme Court, in particular, has been thrown into the
middle of political debates, as it was in the time of Chief Justice Rose

senator-skinner-introduces-sb-1421-open-law-enforcement-records [hereinafter Senator Nancy
Skinner Press Release].
56. Senator Nancy Skinner Press Release, supra note 55.
57. CAL. STATE S., HISTORY OF SENATE BILL NO. 1421, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
58. Police unions fiercely argued against the passage of SB 1421, claiming that making
records of internal misconduct investigations public would further punish officers and “override
the ability of departments to set their own rules for disclosure.” Dillon, supra note 46; see Darwin
BondGraham, California Police Unions Fight New State Law Promising Transparency on
Misconduct Records, THE APPEAL (Feb. 20, 2019), https://theappeal.org/california-police-unionsfight-new-state-law-promising-transparency-on-misconduct-records/ (discussing police union
opposition to SB 1421 and subsequent legal fights after the passage of the bill to restrict the law
from being applied retroactively to older records).
59. HISTORY OF SENATE BILL NO. 1421.
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Bird.60 Major reforms in the criminal justice system must be
accompanied by both judicial and legislative support. Rather than a
new ethos being forced on the public, this dual acceptance of change
reflects a fundamental shift in the balance between police officers’
interests and those of the public, including criminal defendants.
Accordingly, while SB 1421 did not focus exclusively on Brady rights,
its acknowledgment that it is crucial that police departments disclose
dishonesty and misconduct that could affect a defendant’s right to a
fair trial provides firm support that the California Supreme Court’s
balancing in ALADS was aligned with the values of Californians.
V. A NEW ERA AND THE WORK THAT STILL NEEDS TO BE DONE
Both the ALADS decision and SB 1421 were vital to initiating
crucial reforms in California’s criminal justice system. However, there
is still much more work to be done. First and foremost, there is the
need to convince law enforcement that it is really in their best interest
to have such transparency regarding their actions. Historically, access
to police misconduct records has been forged through adversarial
actions.61 While some might say the public has now “won” in the
struggle between police privacy rights and disclosure of their
misconduct, this basic paradigm must be changed to ensure real
reform. Law enforcement must embrace a system in which there is
accountability to the public for police errors and dishonesty.
Changing the culture of any institution is not easy. It involves
hiring officers who understand and agree to abide by a system that will
hold them accountable to the public at large for their misdeeds. No
longer can the police department be a special club that will hide or
tolerate their misdeeds; rather, there must be greater accountability to
the public as a whole. It is important to impress on the rank and file
police, as well as their supervisors, that the rhetoric of the “law and
order” eras should no longer control their behavior. Police officers’
“Bills of Rights” were introduced in reaction to reforms of the 1960s
60. See Cynthia Gorney, Rose Bird and the Court of Conflict, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 1986),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1986/04/08/rose-bird-and-the-court-ofconflict/d391da7f-33dd-4fa5-87b2-a7c79e62e048/; Todd S. Purdum, Rose Bird, Once California’s
Chief Justice, Is Dead at 63, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 1999),
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/06/us/rose-bird-once-california-s-chief-justice-is-dead-at63.html.
61. William Finnegan, How Police Unions Fight Reform, THE NEW YORKER (July 27, 2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/08/03/how-police-unions-fight-reform.
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in an effort to shift more power to the police.62 Today, the push is
toward greater restraints on the police and more accountability to the
courts and the people. It is natural, therefore, that the balance should
shift to openness.
Perhaps more importantly, officers must be trained to understand
why it is in their best interest to be part of an open institution. There
are, in fact, several benefits to the officers themselves. For example,
officers who scrupulously honor defendants’ rights and follow the
rules will not view themselves as outsiders, but as leaders of their
institution. Additionally, officers and their supervisors need not decide
for themselves when there needs to be disclosure of problems in their
past cases.63 With appropriate disclosure rules, officers are not put in
the tough position of deciding whether their allegiance is to fellow
officers or to the public. Knowing that they have an official duty to
serve the interests of the public, including criminal defendants, will
make it less likely that officers are pushed toward covering up
misconduct by themselves or other officers.
There is yet another benefit to law enforcement officials in
embracing ALADS and SB 1421. In order for prosecutors and law
enforcement to be successful in prosecuting cases, jurors must have
confidence in the testimony of law enforcement officers.64 Much has
been written about the issue of “testilying”65 and its impact on making
62. Tan, supra note 37.
63. Brady decisions made by those law enforcement personnel who are most affected by the
disclosure are inherently suspect. Even when there is a good faith effort, police agencies typically
have a difficult time identifying what sort of misconduct should be disclosed. Abel, supra note 39,
at 796–97. Under the Pitchess system advocated by the police in ALADS, judges were also illequipped to evaluate the relevance of police misconduct given the limited information they may
have regarding a case. Id. at 763. Thus, a system, such as that in SB 1421, better ensures the
disclosure of all relevant impeachment information.
64. Traditionally, it was believed that judges and juries were predisposed to trust officers when
their credibility was pitted against the credibility of a criminal defendant. Id. at 795. Yet, that
assumption may no longer apply. See Sara Kropf, Why Judges Should Stop Asking Jurors About
Police Officer Witnesses During Voir Dire, GRAND JURY TARGET (May 15, 2019),
https://grandjurytarget.com/2019/05/15/why-judges-should-stop-asking-jurors-about-policeofficer-witnesses-during-voir-dire/. Studies have shown a strong correlation between jurors’ view
of the credibility of officers and their trust and overall confidence in the prosecution’s case. See
Lauren M. Ouziel, Beyond Law and Fact: Jury Evaluation of Law Enforcement, 92 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 691, 704 (2016).
65. “Testilying” is when law enforcement officers testify falsely in criminal cases, including
during pretrial matters involving the suppression of evidence. Larry Cunningham, Taking on
Testilying: The Prosecutor’s Response to In-Court Police Deception, in CRIME & JUSTICE IN
AMERICA: PRESENT REALITIES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 223, 223 (Wilson R. Palacios et al. eds.,
2nd ed. 2002) (“The term ‘testilying’ . . . usually refers to perjury committed by police officers.”);
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judges and jurors increasingly skeptical of the credibility of law
enforcement witnesses.66 Increased disclosure of the background of
police officers will help jurors identify those officers who might be
lying67 and give more credence to the testimony of other officers who
do not have problematic backgrounds. Accordingly, when officers
testify, jurors can have greater confidence in their credibility when
there have not been any revelations of misconduct.
Finally, officers take an oath to not “betray their integrity,
character or public trust.”68 One benefit to increasing accountability
for police misconduct is the assurance that those officers who abide
by the rules are meeting their oath and professional responsibility. To
the extent officers can cite to this increased standard of
Joseph Goldstein, ‘Testilying’ by Police: A Stubborn Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/nyregion/testilying-police-perjury-new-york.html (noting
that behind closed doors, false testimony by the police is called testilying); Brian Dickerson, Cops
on the Witness Stand Face More Skeptical Juries, DETROIT FREE PRESS (July 5, 2015, 12:22 PM),
https://www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/brian-dickerson/2015/07/04/cops-witness-standface-skeptical-juries/29676921/ (“[A] seemingly unrelenting barrage of video images depicting
police at their worst has taken a toll on uniformed officers’ credibility, on the street and in the
courtroom.”). See generally I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835
(2008) (discussing the origins, history, impacts, and solutions to “testilying”); Christopher
Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 (1996)
(discussing the nature and causes of testilying, and proposals for curtailing it).
66. The overwhelming trust in the credibility of police officers has been eroded and is now
under increased scrutiny by the public. See Mark Joseph Stern, The Police Lie. All the Time. Can
Anything Stop Them?, SLATE (Aug. 4, 2020, 11:51 AM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2020/08/police-testilying.html; Rigodis Appling & Jason Wu, Why Blue Lies Matter: It Is
Everyone’s Business When Police Fail to Tell the Truth, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 3, 2020, 5:00
AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-blue-lies-matter-20200703sgs6rzgidfaztp25jfv3x2iuta-story.html; see also Lindsey M. Cole, In the Aftermath of Ferguson:
Jurors’ Perceptions of the Police and Court Legitimacy Then and Now, in CRIMINAL JURIES IN
THE 21ST CENTURY: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE, AND THE LAW 109, 109
(Cynthia J. Najdowski & Margaret C. Stevenson eds., 2019) (discussing the eroding legitimacy
with which jurors and society view police).
67. See Rachel Moran, Contesting Police Credibility, 93 WASH. L. REV . 1339, 1362–63
(2018) (to assess credibility of police officers, we need greater recordkeeping and transparency of
police misconduct records).
68. Each police department has its own oath. However, many of them are similar to that of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police’s “Law Enforcement Oath of Honor.” It reads: “On
my honor, I will never betray my integrity, my character or the public trust. I will always have the
courage to hold myself and others accountable for our actions. I will maintain the highest ethical
standards and uphold the values of my community, and the agency I serve.” Law Enforcement Oath
of Honor, Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/all/ij/IACP_Oath_of_Honor_En_8.5x11_Web.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2020) (emphasis added).
Many police departments have a set of “Core Values” that are designed to direct the actions of their
officers. Included in those core values is a commitment to integrity in “all we say and do.” See,
e.g., Core Values of the LAPD, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, https://www.lapdonline.org/inside_the_lapd/
content_basic_view/845 (last visited Nov. 22, 2020).
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professionalism, it may engender more pride and satisfaction in their
career work.
Both the ALADS decision and SB 1421 provide mechanisms to
address police misconduct. However, the focus of both is to hold
officers accountable for past misconduct and ensure that any such
misconduct is either addressed by civil remedies or can be used by
defendants when criminally charged.69 While both are critically
important, it should also be the justice system’s goal to prevent police
misconduct in the first place. This will require that officers embrace
the need to refrain from excessive force, discrimination, dishonesty,
and other misconduct. Disclosure on Brady lists or through SB 1421
might be a deterrent for future misconduct, but it is unlikely to be a
magic cure.
For real institutional change, it is critical that law enforcement
officers be trained so that they are consciously aware that their
misconduct will not be covered up. Just as we must train officers not
to be overly aggressive,70 officers must be trained to appreciate why
even small falsehoods in their reports—whether by them or
witnesses—are antithetical to the cause of justice. Even if there is an
inclination to make the facts fit the officer’s intuition that the
defendant is guilty, ALADS and SB 1421 must be cited as a basis for
officers to resist this temptation and guard against such actions. It is
not a defense to dishonest behavior that an officer truly believed the
defendant was guilty. That is not a decision officers get to make. Their
job is to compile the evidence, in an honest fashion, so that the trier of
fact—judge or jury—can make that decision.
True reform is not easy and requires a range of systemic changes,
including more transparency regarding the work and agenda of police
and prosecutorial organizations.71 Unless they embrace more
accountability, it will be difficult for individual defendants or judges
to ensure compliance with Brady and other disclosure laws.
Traditionally, police unions have fought against reform.72 The ALADS
69. See ALADS, 447 P.3d 234, 239 (Cal. 2019); S.B. 1421, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
70. See Joshua Holland, Are We Training Cops to Be Hyper-Aggressive ‘Warriors’?, THE
NATION (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/are-we-training-cops-to-be-hyperaggressive-warriors/.
71. Police unions exert considerable pressure on their rank and file and the Brady process,
which makes implementing reforms more difficult. See Abel, supra note 39, at 788–89.
72. Finnegan, supra note 61; Noam Scheiber et al., How Police Unions Became Such Powerful
Opponents to Reform Efforts, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/06/
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decision is a prime example of that trend. It will take some
sophisticated political maneuvering, or perhaps threats of police
defunding,73 to change the dynamic so there won’t be a need for future
ALADS decisions. Working together with the public, there is likely a
better way to address the need to balance police interests against those
of the public. The approach before ALADS was woefully inefficient,
expensive, inadequate and unfair.74
VI. CONCLUSION
After the ALADS decision was issued, the California Peace
Officers Association (CPOA) issued a statement acknowledging that
the decision “finally put to bed the debate about the role of law
enforcement agencies in the Brady rule.”75 It did not mince words.
Noting how the decision affects law enforcement agencies throughout
the state, it wrote to its membership: “It seems inescapable that there
is a duty upon law enforcement agencies to at least review the
personnel records of its officers to determine if there is potential Brady
material in those records.”76 However, in discussing how such
disclosures will be handled, the CPOA statement also noted that the
“fight” is likely to continue about whether a Brady tip alone is
sufficient.77
One wonders whether we can arrive at an era where disclosure of
information to help defendants and the public will no longer be a
us/police-unions-minneapolis-kroll.html; Kevin Rector, Police Reform Advocates Scrutinize Police
Unions, Calling Them Obstacles to Reform, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.l
atimes.com/california/story/2020-08-18/police-reform-advocates-scrutiny-police-unions; Daniel
Trotta, U.S. Mayors Identify Police Unions as an Obstacle to Reform, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 13, 2020,
1:52 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/top-news/articles/2020-08-13/us-mayors-identifypolice-unions-as-an-obstacle-to-reform.
73. See Jill Cowan, What to Know About Calls to Defund the Police in California, N.Y. TIMES
(June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/09/us/ca-defund-police.html.
74. As noted by Professor Abel:
Systems that balance officers’ confidentiality interests against Brady’s constitutional
requirements get it completely wrong. The protections benefit dishonest cops by
allowing them to testify and, thus, to continue to work the streets. Meanwhile, these
protections harm defendants, who are denied critical impeachment evidence to which
they are entitled under Brady.
Abel, supra note 39, at 807.
75. Gregory P. Palmer & James R. Touchstone, The California Supreme Court Unanimously
Upheld the Disclosure of “Brady Tip Lists” to the Prosecution, CAL. PEACE OFFICERS ASS’N
(Sept. 3, 2019), https://cpoa.org/the-california-supreme-court-unanimously-upheld-the-disclosureof-brady-tip-lists-to-the-prosecution/.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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“fight.” That will take more than a state supreme court case. It will
take a movement—a movement where the public and the police are no
longer seen as opposing or competing actors. The public took note
when the police joined protesters in 2020 in marching for reforms.78
Police will embrace “equal justice” causes if they are not framed
simply as anti-police movements.79 We are in a critical period where
there is an opportunity to change the paradigm from a constant battle
between law enforcement’s interests and those of the public to a
recognition that these interests must be aligned if we are to have
confidence in our criminal justice system.
Brady was decided nearly sixty years ago.80 At the time, it was
considered revolutionary,81 but it has survived and made a momentous
change in how criminal cases are handled. The ALADS decision and
SB 1421 have breathed new life into Brady, but their effectiveness still
very much depends on those within the prosecutorial and law
enforcement communities who have access to the information. They
need to step up to ensure that the promise of both the case and the
legislation are met. Individual case decisions will never take the place
of a sincere, committed effort by those dedicated to fairness to ensure
that each and every defendant receives a fair trial.

78. See K.C. Baker, Police Join Protesters in Marches Across the Country: ‘Good Cops Are
Sick to Their Stomachs’, PEOPLE (June 1, 2020, 5:50 PM), https://people.com/crime/police-joinprotesters-marches-across-country/; Hollie Silverman, Police Officers Are Joining Protesters for
Prayers and Hugs in Several US Cities, CNN (June 2, 2020, 12:30 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/02/us/police-protesters-together/index.html; Lisette Voytko, In
Some Cities, Police Officers Joined Protesters Marching Against Brutality, FORBES (May 31, 2020,
10:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lisettevoytko/2020/05/31/in-some-cities-police-officersjoined-protesters-marching-against-brutality/#4b68f3445edb.
79. Brad Polumbo, Why Support for Criminal Justice Reform Isn’t the Same as Being AntiPolice, U.S.A. TODAY (Sept. 8, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/0
9/08/criminal-justice-reform-isnt-anti-police-support-both-column/5701614002/ (describing
police officers’ willingness to embrace reform not colored as “anti-police”).
80. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady
v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 686 (2006) (“[B]y explicitly commanding prosecutors to
disclose to defendants facing a criminal trial any favorable evidence that is material to their guilt
or punishment, Brady launched the modern development of constitutional disclosure
requirements.”).
81. See Gershman, supra note 80, at 708 (describing the holding in Brady as a “revolution in
criminal justice”).
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